banner



Home  ›  How Might Using The Same Currency Throughout China Have Improved The Empire?

How Might Using The Same Currency Throughout China Have Improved The Empire?

Written By Thursday 21 April 2022 Add Comment Edit

Overview of the economic history of the Ottoman Empire

Existent Gdp per capita in Turkey, 1400 to 1718

The economic history of the Ottoman Empire covers the catamenia 1299–1923. Trade, agriculture, transportation, and faith make up the Ottoman Empire's economic system.

The Ottomans saw armed forces expansion and conscientious use of currency, more than emphasis on manufacturing and industry in the wealth-power-wealth equation, and moving towards capitalist economics comprising expanding industries and markets. They continued along the trajectory of territorial expansion, traditional monopolies, cats, buildings, and agronomics.[Note 1]

Transportation [edit]

16th, 17th, and 18th centuries [edit]

Trade has always been an important aspect of an economy. It was no unlike in the 17th century. As the Ottoman Empire expanded, it started gaining command of important merchandise routes. The capture of Constantinople (1453) to the Ottoman Turks was a key consequence. Along with their victory, they now had significant control of the Silk Route, which European countries used to trade with Asia. Many sources state that the Ottoman Empire "blocked" the Silk Road. This meant that while Europeans could trade through Constantinople and other Muslim countries, they had to pay high taxes. Ottoman-Europe relations were not ever ideal considering a difference in religion seems to accept played an important role in their societies.

Ottoman tariff rates[2]
Mehmed II Beyazid II Selim I
Religion Tariff rate
Muslim %four
Non-Muslim %iv
Foreigners %5
Faith Tariff rate
Muslim %ane or %ii
Non-Muslim %2 or %4
Foreigners %iv or %5
Religion Tariff rate
Muslim %2
Non-Muslim %four
Foreigners %five

The quality of both land and sea transport was driven primarily past the efforts of the Ottoman administration over this fourth dimension. As a result, the quality of transport infrastructure varied significantly over time depending on the electric current administration's efficacy. The story of transport in the empire should non be seen equally one of continual improvement. Indeed, the road infrastructure was significantly better in the 16th century than information technology was in the 18th century.[ citation needed ]

Country [edit]

In Anatolia, the Ottomans inherited a network of caravanserai from the Selçuk Turks who preceded them. The administration and tax-gathering of the empire mandated an interest in ensuring the safety of couriers and convoys and (past extension) of merchant caravans. The caravanserai network extended into the Balkans and provided safe lodgings for merchants and their animals.

The Jelali revolts of the 16th and 17th centuries did much to disrupt the land-send network in Anatolia. The empire could no longer ensure the rubber of merchants who then had to negotiate safe passage with the local leader of the area they were traveling through. Merely in the 18th century with concerted efforts to meliorate the condom of the caravanserai network and the reorganization of a corps of pass-guards did country transport in Anatolia improve.

Ocean [edit]

The empire did not take an active interest in sea merchandise, preferring a free-market system from which they could depict a taxation acquirement. However, such laissez-faire policies were not always followed. For instance, under Hadim Suleyman Pasha's tenure as Grand Vizier until 1544, the Ottoman assistants was directly involved in the spice trade to increment acquirement.[3] However, such policies were ofttimes repealed past their successors.

The master areas of maritime activity were: the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean (main trade: wheat); the Cherry-red Bounding main and Farsi Gulf (principal trade: spices); the Black Sea (master trade: wheat and lumber); and the Western Mediterranean.

In 2020, archaeologists discovered the shipwreck of a massive Ottoman merchant transport in the Mediterranean thought to have sunk in 1630 CE en route from Egypt to Constantinople. The send was 43 meters in length and had burden of one,000 tons, and was transporting wares including Ming-dynasty Chinese porcelain, painted ceramics from Italy, Indian peppercorns, coffee pots, clay tobacco pipes and Arabian incense. The nature of this cargo and the vast size of the vessel are indicative of the activity of Red Sea-Indian Ocean-Mediterranean trade routes during the Ottoman period. [4] [5]

19th century [edit]

During the 19th century, new technologies radically transformed both travel and communications. Through the invention of the steam engine in Britain, water and land transport revolutionized the conduct of merchandise and commerce. The steamship meant journeys became anticipated, times shrank and large volumes of goods could exist carried more cheaply. Quataert cites the Istanbul-Venice route, the chief merchandise artery, taking anything from 15 to eighty-one days by sail send, was reduced to ten days by the steamship. Sail ships would carry 50 to 100 tonnes. In contrast, steamships could now deport i,000 tonnes.[Note 2]

With the advent of the steamship formerly untraversable routes opened upwards. Rivers that carried cargoes only in one direction could now exist traversed both ways bringing innumerable benefits to certain regions. New routes like the Suez Canal were created, prompted by steamships, changing trade demographics across the Most East as merchandise was rerouted. Quataert'due south research shows that the volume of trade began to rise over the 19th century. Past 1900 sailboats accounted for simply 5 pct of ships visiting Istanbul. Still, this 5 percent was greater in number than any year of the 19th century. In 1873 Istanbul handled 4.5 million tons of shipping, growing to 10 million tons by 1900. The development of larger ships accelerated the growth of port cities with deep harbors to accommodate them. Europeans however endemic 0 percent of commercial shipping operating in Ottoman waters. Non all regions benefited from steamships every bit rerouting meant trade from Islamic republic of iran, Iraq and Arabia now did not demand to become through Istanbul, Aleppo, and even Beirut, leading to losses in these territories.[7] [8]

In terms of transport, the Ottoman world could be carve up into two main regions. The European provinces connected by wheeled transport and the non-wheeled transport of Anatolia and the Arab globe. Railroads revolutionized country send profoundly, cutting journeying times drastically promoting population movements and irresolute rural-urban relations. Railroads offered cheap and regular transport for bulk goods, allowing for the beginning time the potential of fertile interior regions to be exploited. When railroads were congenital virtually these regions agriculture developed apace with hundreds of thousands of tons of cereals beingness shipped in this way. Railroads had additional benefits for non-commercial passengers who began using them. 8 million passengers using the one,054-mile Balkan lines and 7 1000000 using the Anatolian 1,488 miles. Railroads also created a new source of employment for over 13,000 workers past 1911.[149] With low population densities and lack of capital, the Ottomans did not develop extensive railroad or shipping industries. Well-nigh of the capital for railroads came from European financiers, which gave them considerable financial command.[9]

Older forms of transport did not disappear with the arrival of steam. The businesses and animals used previously to transport appurtenances between regions found new work in moving goods to and from body lines. The Aegean areas lone had over x,000 camels working to supply local railroads. Ankara station had a thousand camels at a time waiting to unload appurtenances.[10] Furthermore, boosted territories traversed by railroads encouraged evolution and improved agronomics. Like sailing vessels, land transport contributed to and invigorated merchandise and commerce beyond the empire.

Agriculture [edit]

The Ottoman Empire was an agrestal economy, labor deficient, land rich and capital-poor. The majority of the population earned their living from small family unit holdings and this contributed to around xl pct of taxes for the empire directly too every bit indirectly through customs revenues on exports.[ citation needed ]

Economic historians have long tried to determine how agricultural productivity has varied over time and between societies. The magnitude of variations in productivity is often at the cadre of such important historical debates equally to whether there was an agronomical revolution, when and where it happened, and how the standard of living has varied amid societies. Identifying the variations in productivity is also required to be able to decide the divergence of incomes and reversals of fortune in history and to examine the effects of climate, resources, applied science, and institutions on productivity.

Cultivator families drew their livelihoods from a complex set of dissimilar economical activities and non just from growing crops. This included growing a variety of crops for their consumption as well as rearing animals for their milk and wool. Some rural families manufactured goods for auction to others, for case, Balkan villagers traveled to Anatolia and Syria for months to sell their wool cloth.[Notation 3] This pattern established for the 18th century had non significantly changed at the beginning of the 20th century.[12] That is non to say that in that location were no changes in the agrarian sector. Nomads played an of import part in the economic system, providing animate being products, textiles, and transportation. They were troublesome for the state and difficult to control – sedentarization programs took place in the 19th century, coinciding with huge influxes of refugees. This dynamic had the event of a turn down in animal rearing by tribes and an increase in cultivation. The rise commercialization of agronomics commencing in the 18th century meant more than people began to grow more. With increased urbanization, new markets created greater demand, hands met with the advent of railroads. State policy requiring a greater portion of taxes to exist paid in greenbacks influenced the increased production. Finally, increased demand for consumer goods themselves collection an increase in production to pay for the same.[13]

Quataert argues production rose due to some factors. An increase in productivity resulted from irrigation projects, intensive agriculture and integration of modernistic agricultural tools increasing in use throughout the 19th century. By 1900, tens of thousands of plows, reapers and other agricultural technologies such equally combines were constitute across the Balkan, Anatolian and Arab lands. However, almost of the increases in product came from vast areas of state coming under further cultivation. Families began increasing the amount of fourth dimension at work, bringing fallow country into use. Sharecropping increased utilizing land that had been for animal pasturage. Forth with country policy, millions of refugees brought vast tracts of untilled land into production. The empty central Anatolian basin and steppe zone in the Syrian provinces were instances where government agencies gave out smallholdings of land to refugees. This was a recurring pattern across the empire, small landholdings the norm. Foreign holdings remained unusual despite Ottoman political weakness – probably due to strong local and notable resistance and labor shortages. Issawi et al. accept argued that division of labor was non possible, is based on religious grounds.[14] Inalcik, still, demonstrates that the division of labor was historically determined and open to modify. Agricultural reform programs in the tardily 19th century saw the state founding agricultural schools, model farms, and education of a cocky-perpetuating bureaucracy of agrarian specialists focused on increasing agricultural exports. Between 1876 and 1908, the value of agronomical exports just from Anatolia rose past 45 percent whilst tithe proceeds rose by 79 percent.[15]

However, cheap American grain imports undermined agricultural economies across Europe in some cases causing outright economic and political crises.[16]

Manufacturing [edit]

Medieval times [edit]

No formal organization had emerged to organize manufacturing in medieval Anatolia. The closest such system that can be identified is the Ahi Brotherhood, a religious system that followed the Sufi tradition of Islam during the 13th and 14th centuries. Nigh of the members were merchants and craftsmen and viewed taking pride in their piece of work as part and packet of their adherence to Islam. Nevertheless, the organization was not professional and should not be confused with the professional guilds that emerge subsequently.[17]

The emergence of the guilds [edit]

It is not clear when or how various guilds emerged. What is known for sure is that by 1580 guilds had go a well-established aspect of contemporary Ottoman guild. This is evidenced by the Surname of 1582 which was a description of the procession to celebrate the circumcision of Murad III'southward son Mehmed.[xviii] The guilds were organizations that were responsible for the maintenance of standards,

Late 18th century onwards [edit]

Whilst looking at Ottoman manufacture, a significant expanse of technology transfer, Quataert argues one must not only expect at large factories but also the small workshops: "One will find so notice that Ottoman industry was non a "dying, unadaptive, unevolving sector...[but] vital, creative, evolving and various".[xix]

Over the 19th century, a shift occurred to rural female person labor with guild organized urban-based male person labor less of import. The global markets for Ottoman goods fell somewhat with certain sectors expanding. However, any changes were compensated by an increase in domestic consumption and demand.[20] Mechanized production fifty-fifty at its pinnacle remained an insignificant portion of full output. The lack of capital, as in other areas of the economy, deterred the mechanization of production. Withal, some factories did emerge in Istanbul, Ottoman Europe, and Anatolia. In the 1830s steam-powered silk-reeling factories emerged in Salonica, Edirne, West Anatolia and the Lebanon.[21] [22]

Under the late 18th century fine textiles, hand-made yarns and leathers were in high demand exterior the empire. Notwithstanding, these declined by the early 19th century and half a century subsequently production for export re-emerged in the form of raw silk and oriental carpets. The two industries alone employed 100,000 persons in 1914 two-thirds in carpet-making for European and American buyers. Most workers were women and girls, receiving wages that were amongst the lowest in the manufacturing sector. Much of the manufacturing shifted to the urban areas during the 18th century, to benefit from the lower rural costs and wages.[23]

Guilds operating before the 18th century did come across a decline through the 18th and 19th centuries. Guilds provided some form of security in prices, restricting production and controlling quality and provided support to members who striking hard times. However, with market forces driving down prices their importance declined, and with the Janissaries as their backers, existence disbanded past Mahmut 2 in 1826, their fate was sealed.[24] [21]

By far the bulk of producers targeted the 26 million domestic consumers who often lived in adjacent provinces to the producer. Analyzing these producers is difficult, as they did not belong to organizations that left records.

Manufacturing through the menstruum 1600–1914 witnessed remarkable continuities in the loci of manufacturing; industrial centers flourishing in the 17th century were often still active in 1914.[25] Manufacturing initially struggled against Asian and then European competition in the 18th and 19th centuries whereby handicraft industries were displaced by cheaper industrially produced imports.[Notation iv] Nonetheless, manufacturing achieved surprising output levels, with the decline of some industries existence more compensated by the ascension of new industries.[27] The refuse of handicrafts production saw a shift of output move to agronomical commodity production and other manufacturing output.[Note 5]

19th century [edit]

Throughout the 19th century, Arab republic of egypt was effectively independent of the empire and had a much more avant-garde economy. Its per-capita income comparable to that of France, and higher than the overall average income of Eastern Europe and Japan.[29] Economical historian Jean Barou estimated that, in terms of 1960 dollars, Arab republic of egypt in 1800 had a per-capita income of $232 ($1,025 in 1990 dollars). In comparing, per-capita income in terms of 1960 dollars for France in 1800 was $240 ($ane,060 in 1990 dollars), for Eastern Europe in 1800 was $177 ($782 in 1990 dollars), and for Nihon in 1800 was $180 ($795 in 1990 dollars).[30] [31] In addition to Egypt, other parts of the Ottoman Empire, peculiarly Syria and southeastern Anatolia, also had a highly productive manufacturing sector that was evolving in the 19th century.[32]

In 1819, Egypt under Muhammad Ali began programs of state-sponsored industrialization, which included setting up factories for weapons production, an fe foundry, large-scale cotton tillage, mills for ginning, spinning and weaving of cotton, and enterprises for agricultural processing. By the early 1830s, Arab republic of egypt had 30 cotton mills, employing nearly 30,000 workers.[33] In the early 19th century, Egypt had the world'southward fifth most productive cotton manufacture, in terms of the number of spindles per capita.[34] The industry was initially driven by machinery that relied on traditional energy sources, such as brute power, h2o wheels, and windmills, which were besides the primary free energy sources in Western Europe up until effectually 1870.[35] While steam ability had been experimented with in Ottoman Egypt by engineer Taqi Advertising-Din Muhammad ibn Ma'ruf in 1551, when he invented a steam jack driven by a rudimentary steam turbine,[36] information technology was under Muhammad Ali of Egypt in the early 19th century that steam engines were introduced to Egyptian industrial manufacturing.[35]

While there was a lack of coal deposits in Arab republic of egypt, prospectors searched for coal deposits there and manufactured boilers which were installed in Egyptian industries such as ironworks, textile manufacturing, paper mills and hulling mills. Coal was likewise imported from overseas, at similar prices to what imported coal cost in France, until the 1830s, when Egypt gained access to coal sources in Lebanon, which had a yearly coal output of 4,000 tons. Compared to Western Europe, Egypt also had superior agriculture and an efficient transport network through the Nile. Economic historian Jean Batou argues that the necessary economic conditions for rapid industrialization existed in Egypt during the 1820s–1830s, too every bit for the adoption of oil as a potential energy source for its steam engines later on in the 19th century.[35]

Following the decease of Muhammad Ali in 1849, his industrialization programs vicious into turn down, after which, according to historian Zachary Lockman, "Arab republic of egypt was well on its way to total integration into a European-dominated world market every bit a supplier of a single raw cloth, cotton." He argues that, had Egypt succeeded in its industrialization programs, "it might have shared with Japan [or the Us] the distinction of achieving autonomous capitalist development and preserving its independence."[33]

Economical historian Paul Bairoch argues that free merchandise contributed to deindustrialization in the Ottoman Empire. In dissimilarity to the protectionism of Cathay, Nippon, and Kingdom of spain, the Ottoman Empire had a liberal trade policy, open to imports. This has origins in capitulations of the Ottoman Empire, dating back to the commencement commercial treaties signed with French republic in 1536 and taken farther with capitulations in 1673 and 1740, which lowered duties to 3% for imports and exports. The liberal Ottoman policies were praised past British economists such equally J. R. McCulloch in his Dictionary of Commerce (1834), but later criticized by British politicians such as Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli, who cited the Ottoman Empire as "an example of the injury done by unrestrained contest" in the 1846 Corn Laws debate:[37]

There has been free merchandise in Turkey, and what has it produced? Information technology has destroyed some of the finest manufacturers in the world. As tardily every bit 1812 these articles existed, only they have been destroyed. That was the consequences of competition in Turkey, and its furnishings have been equally pernicious as the furnishings of the contrary principle in Spain.

Domestic [edit]

Domestic trade vastly exceeded international trade in both value and volume though researchers accept petty in direct measurements.[38] Much of Ottoman history has been based on European archives that did non document the empire'due south internal trade resulting in it existence underestimated.[39]

Quataert illustrates the size of internal trade by because some examples. The French Administrator in 1759 commented that total textile imports into the empire would clothe a maximum of 800,000 of a population of at least twenty million. In 1914 less than a quarter of agricultural produce was being exported the rest being consumed internally.[40] [41] The early 17th century saw merchandise in Ottoman-fabricated goods in the Damascus province exceeded five times the value of all foreign-made goods sold there. Finally, amidst the sparse internal trade data are some 1890s statistics for iii not-leading cities. The sum value of their interregional trade in the 1890s equaled around 5 percentage of full Ottoman international export trade at the fourth dimension. Given their minor status, cities like Istanbul, Edirne, Salonica, Damascus, Beirut or Aleppo being far greater than all three, this is impressively high. These major merchandise centers, dozens of medium-sized towns, hundreds of pocket-sized towns and thousands of villages remain uncounted – it puts into perspective the size of domestic trade.[38]

2 factors that had a major touch on on both internal and international trade were wars and government policies. Wars had a major impact on commerce, peculiarly where in that location were territorial losses that would rip apart Ottoman economical unity, often destroying relationships and patterns that had endured centuries. The role of government policy is more than hotly debated – nonetheless, near policy-promoted barriers to Ottoman international and internal commerce disappeared or were reduced sharply.[42] However, there appears piddling to bespeak a significant decline in internal trade other than the disruption acquired past state of war and ad-hoc territorial losses.

International [edit]

Global merchandise increased around sixty-fourfold in the 19th century whereas for the Ottomans it increased around 10 to sixteenfold. The exports of cotton solitary doubled betwixt 1750 and 1789. The largest increases were recorded from the ports of Smyrna and Salonica in the Balkans. However, they were partially outset by some reductions from Syrian arab republic and Constantinople. While cotton exports to France and England doubled between the late 17th and late 18th centuries, exports of semi-processed appurtenances to northwest Europe also increased. Whilst the Ottoman marketplace was of import to Europe in the 16th century, it was no longer so by 1900. The Ottoman Empire was not shrinking - quite the opposite – yet, it was becoming relatively less meaning.[24]

Every bit regards trade imbalance, only Constantinople ran an import surplus. Both Lampe and McGowan argue that the empire as a whole, and the Balkans in item, continued to record an export surplus throughout the period.[Note half dozen] The residual of trade nevertheless moved against the Ottomans from the 18th century onwards. They would re-export high-value luxury goods, mainly silks from the Far East and exported many of its goods. Luxury goods began beingness imported. Through the 18th century, exports moved to unprocessed goods whilst at the aforementioned time commodities were imported from European colonies. Nigh of these commodities were produced by forced labor undercutting domestic production. However, according to most scholars, a favorable residual of trade still existed at the end of the 18th century.[40] 19th century merchandise increased multi-fold, nonetheless exports remained similar to 18th century levels. Foodstuffs and raw materials were the focus with carpets and raw silk appearing in the 1850s.[44] Although the handbasket of exports remained by and large constant, the relative importance of the goods would vary considerably.

From the 18th century onwards, foreign merchants and Ottoman non-Muslims became dominant in the growing international trade. With increasing abundance, their political significance grew, peculiarly in Syria. Muslim merchants however dominated internal merchandise and merchandise between the interior and coastal cities.[Note 7]

Foreign merchandise, a minor part of the Ottoman economy, became slightly more important towards the stop of the 19th century with the rise of protectionism in Europe and producers looking to new markets. Its growth was seen throughout the period nether written report, particularly the 19th century.[ citation needed ] Throughout, the balance of payments was roughly on par with no significant long-term deficits or surpluses.[ citation needed ]

Finance [edit]

Ottoman bureaucratic and armed services expenditure was raised by taxation, by and large from the agrarian population.[46] [47] Pamuk notes considerable variation in monetary policy and practice in different parts of the empire.[47] Although at that place was monetary regulation, enforcement was often relaxed and petty effort was made to control the activities of merchants, moneychangers, and financiers.[Annotation 8] During the "price revolution" of the 16th century, when inflation took off, there were price increases of around 500 percent[Note 9] from the stop of the 15th century to the close of the 17th.[Note 10] Even so, the problem of inflation did non remain and the 18th century did not witness the problem over again.

The 18th century witnessed increasing expenditure for war machine-related expenditure and the 19th century for both hierarchy and armed services. McNeill describes an Ottoman stagnation through center-periphery relations – a moderately taxed middle with periphery provinces suffering the brunt of costs.[Note 11] Though this analysis may utilize to some provinces, like Hungary, recent scholarship has found that virtually of the financing was through provinces closer to the center.[52] As the empire modernized itself in line with European powers, the role of the central land grew and diversified. In the past, it had contented itself with raising tax revenues and state of war-making. It increasingly began to accost education, health and public works, activities that used to exist organized by religious leaders in the communities – this can exist argued as being necessary in a apace changing globe and was a necessary Ottoman response. At the end of the 18th century, there were around 2,000 civil officials ballooning to 35,000 in 1908.[53] Starting in the mid 1800s, the Ottoman military increasingly adopted western technology and methods.[54] Other innovations were increasingly existence adopted including the telegraph, railroads and photography, utilised confronting onetime mediators who were increasingly marginalised.[Note 12]

Upwards to 1850, the Ottoman Empire was the only empire to have never contracted foreign debt and its fiscal situation was by and large audio.[55] [56] Every bit the 19th century increased the country's fiscal needs, information technology knew it could not raise the revenues from revenue enhancement or domestic borrowings, so resorted to massive debasement and and then issued paper money.[57] [58] Information technology had considered European debt, which had surplus funds available for overseas investment, just avoided it aware of the associated dangers of European control.[43] [59] [60] [61] However, the Crimean war of 1853–1856 resulted in the necessity of such debt. Between 1854 and 1881, the Ottoman Empire went through a critical stage of history. Beginning with the first foreign loan in 1854, this process involved sporadic attempts by western powers to impose some command. From 1863 a second and more intense stage began leading to a snowballing upshot of accumulated debts. In 1875, with external debt at 242 meg Turkish pounds, over half the budgetary expenditures going toward its service, the Ottoman government facing some economic crises declared its disability to make repayments. The autumn in tax revenues due to bad harvests and increased expenditure made worse by the costs of suppressing the uprisings in the Balkans hastened the slide into defalcation. After negotiations with the European powers, the Public Debt Administration was ready, to which sure revenues were assigned. This arrangement subjected the Ottomans to foreign financial control from which they failed to complimentary themselves, in part because of connected borrowing. In 1914, the Ottoman debt stood at 139.one meg Turkish pounds, and the regime was still dependent on European financiers.[62]|grouping=Note}}[60] [63] [64] [65] [66]

The Ottomans had not yet developed their financial arrangement in line with London and Paris. Since the first of the 18th century, the government was aware of the need for a reliable bank. The Galata bankers, as well equally the Bank of Constantinople, did not have the capital or competence for such large undertakings.[43] [67] As such, Ottoman borrowings followed the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem.

Borrowing spanned two distinct periods, 1854–1876 (see Table 4). The first is the most of import resulted in defaults in 1875. Borrowings were normally at 4 to 5 percent of the nominal value of the bond, new problems, notwithstanding, being sold at prices well below these values netted of commissions involved in the issue, resulting in a much higher effective borrowing charge per unit – coupled with a deteriorating financial state of affairs, the borrowing rate rarely went beneath ten percent later on 1860.[68]

European involvement began with the cosmos of the Public Debt Administration, after which a relatively peaceful catamenia meant no wartime expenditures and the budget could be balanced with lower levels of external borrowing. The semi-democratic Egyptian province likewise ran up huge debts in the late 19th century resulting in foreign military intervention. With security from the Debt Administration farther European upper-case letter entered the empire in railroad, port and public utility projects, increasing strange capital control of the Ottoman economic system.[69] The debt burden increased consuming a sizeable clamper of the Ottoman tax revenues – by the early on 1910s deficits had begun to grow again with war machine expenditure growing and some other default may have occurred had it not been for the outbreak of the Outset World War.

The verbal corporeality of annual income the Ottoman government received, is a matter of considerable debate, due to the scantness and ambiguous nature of the primary sources. The following tabular array contains approximate estimates.

Year Annual Revenue
1433 2,500,000 ducats[seventy]
1496 iii,300,000 ducats[71]
1520 3,130,000 ducats[71]
1526 four,500,000 ducats[71]
1530 6,000,000 ducats[72]
1553 seven,166,000 ducats[71]
1558 7,740,000 ducats[71]
1566 viii,000,000 ducats[72]
1587 9,000,000 ducats[71]
1592 10,000,000 ducats[71]
1603 viii,000,000 ducats[71]
1660 12,000,000 ducats[72]

Run into also [edit]

  • Capitulations of the Ottoman Empire, these were merchandise agreements with specific countries
  • Sick man of Europe
  • Socioeconomics of the Ottoman enlargement era
  • Ottoman Decline Thesis

Notes [edit]

  1. ^ In economical terms, neither the Marxian Asiatic way of production nor the feudal manner constitute in medieval Europe reverberate the Ottoman economic system accurately, every bit it falls somewhere in between the ii - excess peasant product was taxed by the country as opposed to it being paid in rent to feudal lords.[i]
  2. ^ Comparatively large ships like the Titanic could behave 66,000 tonnes.[6]
  3. ^ İslamoğlu-İnan's study of Anatolia from the seventeenth century finds state policy past way of taxation and inheritance laws encouraged peasants to commercially develop fruits, vegetables and sheep.[11]
  4. ^ Quataert's study of the Istanbul port workers and their struggle over ii decades against the European companies with indirect support from the land highlights the departure between colonial administrators elsewhere and the Ottoman government.[26]
  5. ^ For example, silk reel product from the Levant emerged in the nineteenth century, as did the production of raw silks and carpets.[28]
  6. ^ Equally early on as 1850, French authorities became concerned that imports of 27.3 meg francs from the Ottoman Empire exceeded what France was exporting to the xix.9 one thousand thousand francs and was anxious to balance the two figures.[43]
  7. ^ In 1793, Aleppo solitary issued 1,500 certificates to Ottoman non-Muslims for such privileges which through the course of the eighteenth century immune them to supercede their European counterparts. Istanbul boasted over one,000 registered merchants in the early twentieth century, of which only 3 per cent comprised British, French or German merchants.[45]
  8. ^ Nether Islamic police force usury was prohibited, Pamuk quotes some stratagems that were used, notably double-auction agreements.[48] [49]
  9. ^ These figures are based on price indices Pamuk constructed for Istanbul in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; other scholars have recorded similar trends for the flow.[49]
  10. ^ Pamuk argues the Turkish economic historian Omer Barkan is wrong in attributing price rises to imported inflation rather the cause being the velocity of circulation of coin drove prices up, as well as increasing commercialization with the growing use of coin as a medium of exchange.[48] [l]
  11. ^ McNeill'south the contribution was informed by his research on relations between centers and peripheries of world empires.[51]
  12. ^ These comprised various groups such equally the Janissaries, guilds, tribes, religious authorities and provincial notables.[54]

References [edit]

  1. ^ Faroqhi (1999), pp. 189–191
  2. ^ Bilgin, Arif; Çağlar, Burhan (eds.). Klasikten Moderne Osmanlı Ekonomisi. Turkey: Kronik Kitap. p. 28.
  3. ^ Casale (2006)
  4. ^ "Huge Ottoman shipwreck found after 70-year hunt". The National . Retrieved 2020-04-23 .
  5. ^ Alberge, Dalya (2020-04-18). "Mediterranean shipwrecks reveal 'nativity of globalisation' in trade". The Observer. ISSN 0029-7712. Retrieved 2020-04-23 .
  6. ^ Quataert (2000), pp. 117–118
  7. ^ Quataert (2004), p. 302
  8. ^ Quataert (2000), pp. 116–118
  9. ^ Quataert (2000), pp. 116–121
  10. ^ Pamuk (1987), p. 124
  11. ^ İslamoğlu-İnan (2004), p. 123
  12. ^ Quataert (2000), pp. 128–129
  13. ^ Quataert (2000), pp. 129–130
  14. ^ Issawi (1966), p. 114
  15. ^ Quataert (1975), pp. 210–211
  16. ^ Critz, Olmstead & Rhode (1999)
  17. ^ Baer (1970)
  18. ^ von Hammer (1829), pp. 126ff, 626–629
  19. ^ Frangakis-Syrett (1994), p. 115
  20. ^ Quataert (2000), p. 132
  21. ^ a b Quataert (2000), pp. 132–137
  22. ^ Frangakis-Syrett (1994), p. 116
  23. ^ Quataert (2000), p. 133
  24. ^ a b Reeves-Ellington, B.[ full citation needed ]
  25. ^ İnalcık & Quataert (1994), p. v
  26. ^ Pamuk (1984b)
  27. ^ Quataert (2000), p. 110
  28. ^ Pamuk (1987), p. 8
  29. ^ Jean Batou (1991). Between Development and Underdevelopment: The Precocious Attempts at Industrialization of the Periphery, 1800–1870. Librairie Droz. pp. 181–196. ISBN9782600042932.
  30. ^ Jean Batou (1991). Between Evolution and Underdevelopment: The Precocious Attempts at Industrialization of the Periphery, 1800–1870. Librairie Droz. p. 189. ISBN9782600042932.
  31. ^ M. Shahid Alam (2016). Poverty From The Wealth of Nations: Integration and Polarization in the Global Economy since 1760. Springer Science+Business organisation Media. p. 33. ISBN9780333985649.
  32. ^ Donald Quataert (2002). Ottoman Manufacturing in the Age of the Industrial Revolution. Cambridge University Press. ISBN9780521893015.
  33. ^ a b Zachary Lockman (Autumn 1980). "Notes on Egyptian Workers' History". International Labor and Working-Course History (eighteen): ane–12. JSTOR 27671322.
  34. ^ Jean Batou (1991). Between Development and Underdevelopment: The Precocious Attempts at Industrialization of the Periphery, 1800–1870. Librairie Droz. p. 181. ISBN9782600042932.
  35. ^ a b c Jean Batou (1991). Betwixt Development and Underdevelopment: The Precocious Attempts at Industrialization of the Periphery, 1800–1870. Librairie Droz. pp. 193–196. ISBN9782600042932.
  36. ^ Ahmad Y Hassan (1976), Taqi Al-Din and Arabic Mechanical Technology, p. 34–35, Found for the History of Arabic Science, University of Aleppo
  37. ^ Paul Bairoch (1995). Economics and World History: Myths and Paradoxes. Academy of Chicago Press. pp. 31–32. Archived from the original on 2017-10-12. Retrieved 2017-08-16 .
  38. ^ a b Quataert (2000), pp. 126–127
  39. ^ Faroqhi (1999), p. 142
  40. ^ a b Quataert (2000), p. 126
  41. ^ Pamuk (1984a), p. 109
  42. ^ Quataert (2000), pp. 124–125
  43. ^ a b c Raccagni (1980), p. 342
  44. ^ Pamuk (1984a), pp. 109–111
  45. ^ Quataert (2000), pp. 127–128
  46. ^ Quataert (2000), p. 71
  47. ^ a b Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). "Turkey". Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. 27 (11th ed.). Cambridge Academy Printing. p. 443.
  48. ^ a b Wilson (2003), p. 384
  49. ^ a b Pamuk (2000)
  50. ^ Pamuk (2001), pp. 73–85
  51. ^ McNeill (1964)
  52. ^ Finkel (1988), p. 308, cited by Faroqhi (1999), p. 180
  53. ^ Quataert (2000), p. 62
  54. ^ a b Quataert (2000), p. 63
  55. ^ Quataert (2000), p. 341
  56. ^ Pamuk (1984a), p. 110
  57. ^ Clay (2001a), p. 204
  58. ^ Pamuk (2001)
  59. ^ Pamuk (2001), p. 71
  60. ^ a b Anderson (1964)
  61. ^ Clay (1994), pp. 589–596
  62. ^ Dirt (2001b)
  63. ^ Clay (1994), p. 589
  64. ^ 1875–1914 Archived 2008-04-10 at the Wayback Machine, Bartleby Encyclopaedia of Globe History, 2001
  65. ^ Eldem (2005)
  66. ^ Pamuk (1987), p. 57
  67. ^ Clay (1994), pp. 589–590
  68. ^ Pamuk (1987), p. 59
  69. ^ Pamuk (1987), pp. 130–131
  70. ^ Treadgold (1997), p. 969
  71. ^ a b c d eastward f thousand h Lybyer (1913), p. 180
  72. ^ a b c Lybyer (1913), p. 181

Bibliography [edit]

  • Anderson, Olive (1964). "Great Britain and the beginnings of the Ottoman public debt, 1854–55". The Historical Journal. vii (one): 47–63. doi:10.1017/S0018246X00025255. JSTOR 3020517.
  • Baer, Gabriel (1970). "The authoritative, economic and social functions of Turkish guilds". International Journal of Middle East Studies. i (i): 28–fifty. doi:10.1017/S0020743800023898.
  • Balla, Eliana. and Noel D. Johnson, "Fiscal crunch and institutional modify in the Ottoman Empire and France." Journal of Economical History (2009) 69#3 pp: 809-845 online.
  • Casale, Giancarlo (2006). "The Ottoman administration of the spice trade in the sixteenth century Red Sea and Western farsi Gulf". Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient. 49 (ii): 170–198. doi:10.1163/156852006777502081.
  • Clay, Christopher (1994). "The origins of modern banking in the Levant: the co-operative network of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, 1890–1914". International Journal of Centre East Studies. 26 (four): 589–614. doi:10.1017/S0020743800061122.
  • Clay, Christopher (2001a). "Book review: The Ottoman city between eastward and westward: Aleppo, Izmir, and Istanbul". Economical History Review. 54 (1): 204. doi:10.1111/1468-0289.t01-1-00189.
  • Clay, Christopher (2001b). Gilded for the Sultan: Western Bankers and Ottoman Finance, 1856–1881. IB Taurus. ISBN9781860644764.
  • Conte, Giampaolo. "Ottoman and Greek Sovereign Debt and Bankruptcy: A Long-Term Comparative Assay." The Journal of European Economic History 48.ii (2019): 111-123 online
  • Critz, José Morilla; Olmstead, Alan L.; Rhode, Paul W. (1999). ""Horn of Plenty": The globalization of Mediterranean horticulture and the economic development of southern Europe, 1880–1930". Journal of Economic History. 59 (2): 316–352. doi:10.1017/S0022050700022853. JSTOR 2566554. PMID 21987866.
  • Eldem, Edhem (2005). "Ottoman financial integration with Europe: foreign loans, the Ottoman Bank and the Ottoman public debt". European Review. 13 (3): 431–445. doi:10.1017/S1062798705000554.
  • Faroqhi, Suraiya (1999). Approaching Ottoman History: an Introduction to the Sources. Cambridge University Press. ISBN9780521666480.
  • Finkel, C. (1988). The Assistants of Warfare: the Ottoman Military Campaigns in Hungary 1593–1606. Vol. I. Vienna: VWGO.
  • Frangakis-Syrett, Elena (1994). "Book review: Donald Quataert, Manufacturing and Technology Transfer in the Ottoman Empire, 1800–1914, Études Turques-USHS no. 2 (Istanbul/Strasbourg: Isis Press and Université des Sciences Humaines de Strasbourg, 1992). Pp. 61". International Journal of Middle E Studies. 26 (i): 114–116. doi:10.1017/S0020743800059869.
  • von Hammer, J. (1829). Geschichte des osmanischen Reichs. Vol. IV. Pest.
  • İnalcık, Halil; Quataert, Donald (1994). An Economical and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1914. Cambridge University Printing. ISBN9780521343152.
  • İslamoğlu-İnan, Huri (2004). "State and peasants in the Ottoman Empire: a report of peasant economy in north-cardinal Anatolia during the sixteenth century". In Huri İslamoğlu-İnan (ed.). The Ottoman Empire and the World-Economy. Cambridge Academy Press. pp. 101–159. ISBN9780521526074.
  • Issawi, C. (1966). The Economic History of the Middle Due east, 1800–1914: a book of Readings . London: University of Chicago Press.
  • Lybyer, Albert Howe (1913). The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent. Cambridge University Printing.
  • McNeill, W. (1964). Europe's Steppe Frontier 1500–1800. London: University of Chicago Press.
  • Pamuk, Sevket. "The evolution of financial institutions in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1914." Financial History Review 11.1 (2004): 7–32. online
  • Pamuk, Şevket (1984a). "The Ottoman Empire in the 'Great Depression' of 1873–1896". Journal of Economic History. 44: 107–118. doi:10.1017/S0022050700031399.
  • Pamuk, Şevket (1984b). "Book review: Social Disintegration and Pop Resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1881–1908: Reactions to European Economical Penetration. Past Donald Quataert. Studies in Near Eastern Civilisation. New York: New York University Press, 1983. Distributed by Columbia Academy Press, New York. Pp. xxii, 205. $35.00". Journal of Economic History. 44 (three): 872–873. doi:10.1017/S0022050700032654.
  • Pamuk, Şevket (1987). The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism 1820–1913: Trade, Investment and Production. Cambridge University Press. ISBN9780521130929.
  • Pamuk, Şevket (2000). A Budgetary History of the Ottoman Empire. Cambridge University Press. ISBN9780521617116.
  • Pamuk, Şevket (2001). "The toll revolution in the Ottoman Empire reconsidered". International Journal of Middle East Studies. 33 (1): 69–89. doi:10.1017/S0020743801001040.
  • Pamuk, Sevket. The Ottoman economic system and its institutions (Ashgate Publishers, 2009).
  • Pamuk, Şevket. "The Ottoman Economy in Globe War I." in The Economics of World War I (2005): 112-36.
  • Quataert, Donald (1975). "Dilemma of development: the agricultural depository financial institution and agronomical reform in Ottoman Turkey, 1888–1908". International Journal of Middle East Studies. 6 (2): 210–227. doi:ten.1017/S002074380002451X. JSTOR 162420.
  • Quataert, Donald (2000). The Ottoman Empire, 1700–1922. New Approaches to European History. Vol. 34. Cambridge University Press. ISBN9780521633604.
  • Quataert, Donald (2004). "A provisional study concerning the impact of European capital on Ottoman port workers, 1880–1909". In Huri İslamoğlu-İnan (ed.). The Ottoman Empire and the World-Economy. Cambridge University Press. pp. 300–310. ISBN9780521526074.
  • Raccagni, Michelle (1980). "The French economic interests in the Ottoman Empire". International Journal of Middle Due east Studies. 11 (3): 339–376. doi:10.1017/S0020743800054672.
  • Treadgold, Warren (1997). A History of the Byzantine State and Lodge. Stanford Academy Printing. ISBN9780804726306.
  • Ülker, Erol. "Military, Finance, and Economic system in the Late Ottoman Empire: Directorate-General of Hedjaz and Military Railways and Ports, 1914–1919." Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 22.1 (2020): 17-28 online.
  • Vlami, Despina. Trading with the Ottomans: The Levant Company in the Middle East (Bloomsbury, 2014).
  • Wilson, R. (2003). "Book review: A Budgetary History of the Ottoman Empire. By Şevket Pamuk. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2000. xxvi + 276 pp. Alphabetize, notes, bibliography, graphs, map, photographs. Fabric, $70.00". Business History Review. 77 (2): 384–386. doi:ten.2307/30041180. ISBN0-521-44197-8. JSTOR 30041180.

How Might Using The Same Currency Throughout China Have Improved The Empire?,

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_history_of_the_Ottoman_Empire

Posted by: folsehishey.blogspot.com

0 Response to "How Might Using The Same Currency Throughout China Have Improved The Empire?"

Post a Comment

Subscribe to: Post Comments (Atom)

Iklan Atas Artikel

Iklan Tengah Artikel 1

Iklan Tengah Artikel 2

Iklan Bawah Artikel